Abstract-Congestion-dependent pricing is a form of traffic management that ensures the efficient allocation of bandwidth between users and applications. As the unpredictability of congestion prices creates revenue uncertainty for network providers and cost uncertainty for users, it has been suggested that forward contracts could be used to manage these risks. We develop a novel game-theoretic model of a multiprovider communication network with two complementary segments and investigate whether forward contracts would be adopted by service providers. Service on the upstream segment is provided by a single Internet service provider (ISP) and priced dynamically to maximize profit, while several smaller ISPs sell connectivity on the downstream network segment, with the advance possibility of entering into forward contracts with their users for some of their capacity. We show that the equilibrium forward contracting volumes are necessarily asymmetric, with one downstream provider entering into fewer forward contracts than the other competitors, thus ensuring a high subsequent downstream price level. In practice, network providers will choose the extent of forward contracting strategically based not only on their risk tolerance, but also on the market structure in the interprovider network and their peers' actions.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE PRICING for Internet service is currently based on access bandwidth and usage. However, with the growing diversity of applications using the Internet, there is considerable interest in designing a future Internet architecture that would allow users to indicate the value they place on network service by purchasing end-to-end quality of service (QoS) from the service provider.
Congestion-dependent pricing for communication networks has been proposed [2] - [7] as a method of traffic management that can efficiently allocate bandwidth among users-e.g., households, small businesses, large service providers-who place different values on their applications. Congestion-dependent pricing ensures that users have an incentive to control congestion. The highly influential paper of Gibbens and Kelly [2] proposed a mechanism to implement usage-based charging. In that scheme, prices are set on the basis of aggregate traffic and communicated periodically to users, who can then decide for themselves how to best satisfy their requirements at the given price. Financial contracts could be used to provide more predictable prices to both service providers and users in a network with congestion pricing. Semret and Lazar and their coauthors published a series of papers on bandwidth pricing and contracts. These include Semret and Lazar [8] , which proposes a market for circuit-switched calls, wherein calls are admitted or rejected at or soon after their arrival time and, if admitted, receive a fixed allocation of capacity and have the option of securing the resource at a guaranteed maximum price for a guaranteed minimum duration. The reservation fee is determined using the Black-Scholes option pricing approach. Semret et al. [9] consider a game-theoretic model of capacity provisioning in a differentiated services Internet, where the players consist of one capacity seller per network, one broker per service per network, and a set of network users. The purchase of forward contracts by the network users is proposed by Anderson et al. as a "Contract and Balancing Mechanism" [10] , which is shown to give users an incentive to control congestion while avoiding the network provider's perverse incentive to cause congestion. On the other hand, Yuksel et al. [11] propose a "contract-switched" Internet, featuring a dynamic interprovider pricing system to provide end-to-end QoS, in conjunction with longer-term financial contracts used for risk management.
In this paper, we ask whether long-term forward contracts would be offered to users in a future Internet with a dynamic interprovider pricing system. Our analysis differs from the above papers by considering the fraction of a provider's capacity to be funded by long-term contracts as a strategic variable. While our analysis is motivated by contracts between Internet service providers and end-users, our model is sufficiently general to be applicable to contracting by large corporate customers, as considered in [10] .
To study the dynamic interactions between multiple network providers in a tractable setting, we develop a two-stage model of bandwidth sold on two complementary 1 segments of a multiprovider communication network by means of dynamic pricing (a spot market). Specifically, the upstream segment is provided by a single large Internet service provider, denoted , and the downstream segment is provided by several smaller ISPs, denoted . The upstream ISP connects the downstream ISPs to the Internet backbone. A schematic diagram of the business relationships is displayed in Fig. 1 . Foros et al. [12] point out that the question of whether backbone providers have incentives to abuse their potential market power has received much attention, both theoretically and in antirust cases. They analyze the interplay between firms and regulatory authorities in different countries by considering a scenario with a single backbone provider.
In the first stage of our model, the downstream ISPs choose the capacity to sell using forward contracts. In the second stage, all ISPs set prices to maximize their respective revenue. Customers must purchase the same amount of bandwidth upstream and downstream in order to use the network services. This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents an overview of our two-stage model. In Section III, we describe a novel extension of the Bertrand-Edgeworth pricing game to model the second-stage interaction between the upstream ISP and the capacity-constrained downstream ISPs competing in prices with each other. We show in Section IV that, for sufficiently low market potential, downstream prices are competed down to marginal cost, while for sufficiently high market potential, there may be multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes, with different divisions of the total industry profit between the upstream and downstream providers. We assume the large upstream ISP has all the bargaining power and can choose which equilibrium will arise. In the region of intermediate market potential, we find an equilibrium point using mixed strategies for the downstream ISPs (Section V). With uncertain future demand for network service, providers have an incentive to enter into forward contracts in the first stage. However, the extent of forward contracting changes the dynamic price outcome in the second stage. In Section VI, we use the pricing analysis to investigate the downstream ISPs' incentives for using forward contracts to fund their bandwidth. We find that a downstream ISP choosing a low contracting volume is able to raise the general downstream price level, allowing its competitors to contract more. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of contracting volumes, if it exists, must have a unique lowest volume of contracting. We further prove that an increase in this lowest volume has a negative marginal externality 2 on other downstream ISPs' utility, whereas an increase in any other contracting volume creates positive marginal externalities. In Section VII, we present conclusions. In order to aid readability, we have relegated the more technical aspects of the proofs of the first two theorems to three lemmas, which are proved in the Appendix.
II. MODEL OVERVIEW
We consider the following two-stage contracting and pricing game played by and . In the first stage, the simultaneously choose to sell capacities by means of forward contracts, where is each 's total capacity. This bandwidth is sold at a price that is fixed in the first stage.
In the second stage, the providers and simultaneously set prices and , to maximize profits and from their uncontracted capacity. The second-stage profits are functions of the prices and the forward contracts chosen in the first stage.
The price sensitivity of bandwidth demand is not known at the time of contracting, but dynamic pricing allows the ISPs to choose their second-stage prices based on the realized price sensitivity. We therefore model the price sensitivity as a random variable that is revealed between the two stages of the game. This means that a risk-averse has an incentive to enter into forward contracts to hedge against demand uncertainty and maximize its total expected utility (1) where denotes expectation over the random price sensitivity , is 's increasing and strictly concave utility function, is 's income derived from forward contracting, denotes expectation over the second-stage mixed strategy prices, and is 's second-stage profit. Although the income from forward contracting is fixed during the first stage and so does not depend on the prices realized during the second stage, we will assume that it does depend on the expected second-stage prices , as this is the fair-market level at which risk-neutral users are willing to enter into forward contracts.
Before we can fully define and analyze the first-stage contracting game in Section VI, we first need to develop the secondstage pricing model.
III. PRICING MODEL
We model the second-stage behavior of the downstream ISPs as "Bertrand-Edgeworth" price competition with capacity constraints, first studied by Edgeworth who showed that the duopoly case might not have an equilibrium in prices [13] . The formulation of the problem with the "rationing rule" considered here is due to Levitan and Shubik [14] . They found that prices are competed down to the perfectly competitive level equal to marginal cost when demand is low; there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, a pair of prices such that neither firm can increase its profit by unilaterally changing its price when demand is high. For the intermediate region of demand, they derived a Nash equilibrium in mixed (random) strategies. Vives [15] established the mixed-strategy equilibrium for the case of symmetric oligopoly with more than two competitors and proved convergence to the perfectly competitive price as the number of firms increases. For any fixed choice of upstream price , our downstream pricing model differs by taking into account forward contracts previously sold by the for diverse fractions of their bandwidth. An important analytic contribution of this paper is the characterization of the mixed-strategy equilibrium for this more complicated asymmetric model. This result is used to find an equilibrium for the full second-stage pricing game where and the choose prices simultaneously. We assume that is a large provider connecting the to the Internet backbone and has all the bargaining power. Thus, where the second-stage pricing game has multiple equilibria, the equilibrium with largest arises. In the special case of , is another monopolist, and our game describes a bilateral monopoly.
On the other hand, where the pricing game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and prices fluctuate, a realistic analysis needs to take into account the timescales over which providers are likely to adjust their prices. This in turn depends on the technologies used for price updates. While the downstream providers can directly broadcast their prices to local users connected to their networks every few seconds, this approach does not scale to a large multiprovider network such as the Internet. The monopolistic transit provider is more likely to make use of a general pricing system. Proposals for implementing interprovider pricing by extending the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [16] have been made by [17] and [18] . Such a system would propagate price changes over the BGP convergence timescale of several minutes. For this reason, we assume that the downstream ISPs' prices are updated on a shorter timescale than the upstream ISP's price, and we model the downstream ISPs' behavior by mixed strategies and the upstream ISP's behavior by a pure strategy.
The bandwidth demand on the upstream ISP's network is the sum of the bandwidth demands served by each on the complementary network segment, i.e., (2) We assume the costs of building the firms' infrastructure are sunk, and zero marginal costs are incurred during operation of the network. According to Odlyzko [19] , "marginal costs are zero up to the point where congestion occurs and forces addition of new capacity." Of course, ISPs also incur nonbandwidth marginal costs, such as the costs of billing and customer support. However, any constant marginal costs can be normalized to zero by redefining the prices, provided the marginal costs incurred by the competing downstream ISPs are equal. Let the upstream ISP's payoff be (3) Suppose each has previously sold capacity by means of forward contracts, so his (second-stage) payoff is 3 (4) In order to obtain closed-form expressions for the equilibrium, we work with a linear demand function [14] , which has been used in the network pricing literature, e.g., [20] (5) where the total price and is the price charged by the marginal with a positive market share, that is, the highest price charged by any with a positive market share. The downstream ISPs' incentives for choosing their contracting volumes under demand uncertainty are to be discussed in Section VI. For the first-stage pricing model, we suppose simply that the market potential 4 and the price sensitivity are given nonnegative constants, and the contracting volumes are given constants with for some . Assume the upstream ISP is not subject to any capacity constraint, other than the total capacity resulting from the capacity of the complementary network segment. To determine the market share of each ISP, we use the rationing rule maximizing consumer surplus chosen by [14] and [21] , which can intuitively be seen as a "water-filling" model: Demand fills the downstream ISPs' capacities in increasing order of price, up to the point where the total demand at the next 's price would be insufficient to leave any market share to that . Demand is split equally between several ISPs with the same price where there is not enough demand to fill their networks completely. An implicit economic assumption in the "water-filling" model is that there is no income effect 5 on bandwidth consumption.
More formally, "water-filling" specifies the bandwidth provided by and the total bandwidth provided by the upstream (and downstream) network by the following four conditions. The bandwidth provided by must satisfy the capacity constraint (6) the capacity of must be exhausted if market demand at price exceeds the total bandwidth used in the network (7) the bandwidth provided by must be zero if market demand at price is less than the total bandwidth used in the network (8) and, finally, demand splits equally between ISPs choosing the same price (9) In the rest of this paper, we shall assume without loss of generality that the are ordered by their contracting volumes as
IV. PURE-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
The equilibrium outcome of the pricing game depends on the available bandwidth capacity compared to the market potential. More precisely, the following definition partitions the range of market potential into three regions by comparing it to the number of 's, the capacity of each , and the contracting volume of firm 1.
Definition 1 (High, Low, Intermediate Market Potential): Let
. Consider the thresholds
We say that market potential is -high if (12) that market potential is -low if (13) and that market potential is -intermediate if (14) As we will now show, in the region of -high market potential network capacity is exhausted. Thus, the total upstream and downstream price is the congestion price, the lowest price at which demand can be satisfied. In the region of -low market potential, competition forces the downstream market price down to marginal cost, which is normalized to zero. In the region of -intermediate market potential, oscillatory price behavior follows, as will be explored in the next section. The following theorem characterizes the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the three regions.
Theorem 1: Pure-strategy equilibria are characterized as follows.
1) If market potential is -high in the pricing game, then there is a range of pure-strategy equilibria given by
Moreover, any -high pure-strategy equilibrium is of this form. 2) If market potential is -low, then there is a unique purestrategy equilibrium such that every sets a zero price and sets . 3) If market potential is -intermediate and , then there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium given by (19) If market potential is -intermediate and , then there is no pure-strategy equilibrium. Some observations may be in order. To begin, note that the general form of the result only differs between the bilateral monopoly and the true downstream oligopoly case when market potential is -intermediate and competition results in the nonexistence of any pure-strategy equilibrium in the oligopoly case. However, the boundaries between the regions depend on the number of downstream firms. In the bilateral monopoly case, for example, the equilibrium with arises only if . In the absence of competition to force the downstream price to zero, this will only happen when market potential is so low that, given the contracting volume , provider cannot obtain a positive profit by setting . On the other hand, when , the theorem says that a purestrategy equilibrium where the set positive prices is necessarily of the form given by (15)- (18) . It is easy to check that this system is inconsistent when market potential is not -high, so an equilibrium of this form can only exist for -high market potential.
Observe that none of the results stated in Theorem 1 depends on the contracting volumes , but only on the lowest contracting volume . In general, any contracting weakens a downstream provider's incentive to set a high price in the pricing game, and the provider with the lowest contracting volume, , will have the strongest incentive to do so. When holds all the bargaining power and market potential is -high, the equilibrium with the highest arises, and the equilibrium price levels are determined by and , the other downstream ISPs being able to follow 's price . When the downstream ISPs have some of the bargaining power, the prices they set increase with market potential. The competition between the downstream ISPs is more significant in this case, and the game is closer to the classical Bertrand-Edgeworth price competition with capacity constraints.
Proof of Theorem 1: If market potential is -high, this allows the choice of satisfying the outlined conditions. We verify that these choices of prices do indeed constitute a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Here, serves a market of maximal size , and he can do no better by cutting his price. The effect on 's profit of a rise in is at the chosen point as well as for any higher value of . Therefore, has no incentive to change his strategy. Since firm 's market share is equal to at our chosen point, and
, it follows that cannot gain by cutting his price. Moreover, cannot increase his profit by raising his price either since (20) where the inequality follows from (17) . We have shown that the chosen point is indeed a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
If market potential is -low, consider the set of strategies , . The price is clearly 's best response to the zero strategy chosen by the : It is the monopolistic price. Observe that the total market served is . Therefore, if were to choose any other price , his profit would be negative. We have established that this set of strategies is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
Conversely, consider any pure-strategy equilibrium given by the tuple of prices . We will start by showing that the equilibrium satisfies (15)- (18) for provided some
. Let be such that with maximal. Suppose there was some such that . Then, we would have by the definition of , so would have an incentive to set equal to . Suppose now that there was some such that . It follows from assumptions (7) and (8) that and would be able to increase his price to any while retaining a market share of . Since , he would increase his profit by doing so. Therefore, we have shown that all prices are equal in our equilibrium (15) .
Suppose we had . Then, if , would have an incentive to increase his market share by cutting his price by any small amount. Hence, we must have at equilibrium and the total market served is (16) .
Our previous argument shows that (17) and (18) must hold at equilibrium, so the and respectively have no incentive to increase their price. We have therefore shown that every nontrivial pure-strategy equilibrium is of the given form.
To show the unique characterization for the equilibrium, consider any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices . We use the following two results, which are direct consequences of the definitions of the downstream ISPs' demand and payoff functions (4)- (9) and of the thresholds for high and low market potential given in Definition 1.
• Suppose market potential is not -low. Then, there exists such that has in equilibrium.
• Suppose market potential is not -high. If , then every has in equilibrium. If market potential is -high, the first result shows that some in equilibrium. For , we have shown that any such equilibrium must be of the form given by (15)- (18) . For , the same argument shows (17) and (18), and it is easy to see that if no provider has an incentive to cut his price, then we have (16) .
If market potential is -low, , the second result shows that every has . If market potential is -low and , it is easy to see that the unique pure-strategy equilibrium is given by , . If market potential is -intermediate and , the two results are contradictory, so there is no pure-strategy equilibrium. Finally, if market potential is -intermediate and , it is easy to see that the unique pure-strategy equilibrium is given by (19) . This completes the proof of the theorem.
V. MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
From Theorem 1, we know that for -intermediate market potential there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when the downstream market is a true oligopoly . Since the downstream ISPs set their prices on a shorter timescale than the upstream ISP, we assume they use mixed strategies, interpreted as distributions of fluctuating prices following [14] . The pricing game can be shown to have an equilibrium point.
Theorem 2: Suppose and market potential is -intermediate in the pricing game. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium point where the price is a pure strategy for and the prices are mixed strategies for each , respectively, such that is locally optimal and each is optimal given the other ISPs' strategies.
Local optimality of the upstream equilibrium price means that has no incentive to make small-scale deviations. The question of global optimality of is of little importance since the other ISPs can in any case not be expected to maintain their strategies if makes large-scale deviations. 6 However, an interesting question that remains is whether allowing to play a mixed strategy leads to a different equilibrium point. We will consider this in Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 2:
The proof of this theorem makes use of a generalization of the solution of the Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly in [14] and [15] , taking forward contracting into account.
Preliminaries: Reduced Pricing Game: We start by considering the reduced pricing game arising between the if has precommitted to a fixed price . In analogy with Definition 1, the following regions turn out to be useful.
Definition 2: Let . We say that market potential is -high if (21) that market potential is -low if (22) and that market potential is -intermediate if
The form of the equilibrium depends on the level of market potential. The following lemma (proved in the Appendix) shows that the reduced pricing game between the has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium if market potential is -high or low, and a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium if market potential is -intermediate. For high market potential, every sets the same positive price, while for low market potential, every sets price zero. For intermediate market potential, each sets a random price chosen from an interval whose upper bound is a decreasing function in its contracting volume .
's strategy may include setting the price to the upper bound with a positive probability.
Lemma 1: The reduced pricing game has the following Nash equilibria.
1) If market potential is -high, then there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, in which each chooses almost surely (i.e., with probability one) (24) One remaining question is whether allowing the upstream ISP to play any mixed strategy gives rise to a different equilibrium. It turns out that this is not the case for mixed-strategy Nash equilibria where bandwidth demand can be served completely and is sufficient to fill all but one downstream ISPs' networks almost surely.
Theorem 3: Let market potential be -intermediate. Suppose there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the pricing game such that almost surely (37) Then, is a pure strategy, and the equilibrium is the equilibrium point given in Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3: Let Inequality (37) must still hold almost surely if plays any pure strategy . For any such pure strategy, 's expected profit is This is a quadratic function with a unique maximum on the domain . Therefore, plays a pure strategy. Given the forward contracts entered into by the downstream providers, we have thus completely characterized the ISPs' pricing behavior. In general, the size of the market potential relative to the available capacity determines whether the game has a pure or mixed-strategy equilibrium.
When market potential is low, there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with downstream prices equal to zero or marginal cost. The downstream ISPs compete the price down in this case, or, for a single downstream firm operating as part of a bilateral monopoly, the capacity sold by forward contracts absorbs all demand.
When market potential is high, there is a range of pure-strategy Nash equilibria with different divisions of the same total network price between the upstream and downstream industries. Bandwidth demand attains the level of available capacity. At this point, the total price is equal to the value of a marginal unit of capacity. This price is commonly referred to as the congestion price. The balance of bargaining power between the firms determines which equilibrium arises. When the upstream ISP has all the bargaining power, the fraction of the total income obtained by the downstream industry is a decreasing function of the lowest contracting volume , but is independent of all other contracting volumes.
For intermediate market potential, there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium only in the case of a bilateral monopoly (and capacity is not exhausted in this case). For a downstream oligopoly , there exists an equilibrium point consisting of optimal mixed strategies for each downstream ISP and a locally optimal pure strategy for the upstream ISP.
Despite the different pricing outcome in the two nontrivial cases of intermediate and high market potential, Section VI shows that the incentives for forward contracting can be analyzed in a uniform way over both regions.
VI. FORWARD CONTRACTING
Having analyzed the second-stage pricing subgame in Sections III-V, by backward induction we can turn our attention to the first stage choice of forward contracting in the game described in Section II. In particular, we will analyze the network providers' choice of contracting under uncertain bandwidth demand. We will establish that the equilibrium contracting volumes are always asymmetric, with one provider choosing the unique lowest contracting volume, before deriving the form of the externalities within the oligopoly that are due to the choice of contracting volumes in equilibrium. The results of the previous sections show that the lowest contracting volume is an important factor in determining second-stage prices. In the case of the pure-strategy equilibrium outcome, the lowest contracting volume is the only contracting volume that determines the second-stage outcome. As the smallest contracting volume increases, downstream prices decline, hurting all downstream providers. However, the firm with the smallest contracting volume is clearly subject to more price risk than the other providers.
We now relax the assumption that to allow capacities sold by forward contracting. When some or , we assume the outcome of the second-stage pricing game is the continuous extension of the pure-strategy equilibrium of Theorem 1 or the equilibrium of Theorem 2, as appropriate. 7 We formally define the first-stage income from forward contracts sold at the expected second-stage price as (38) Recall from Definition 1 that the market potential is 0-high if and 0-low if . In the case of 0-high market potential, it is easy to show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of contracting volumes exists and all but one contracting volumes are maximal in equilibrium. In the more general case where we only know that market potential is not 0-low (so the downstream ISPs may not compete prices down to zero in the second stage), we do not know whether there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the first-stage choice of contracting volumes. However, any such equilibrium must satisfy the following result.
Theorem 4: Suppose market potential is not 0-low and the ISPs' second-stage moves are the ones predicted by Theorems 1 and 2, assuming the greatest when there are multiple equilibria. Suppose there is a pure-strategy equilibrium of positive first-stage contracting volumes, so without loss of generality for every (39) Then, the lowest contracting volume is unique, i.e., for every (40) Thus, when market potential is not 0-low, any contracting equilibrium where the downstream ISPs obtain positive payoffs must be asymmetric. A risk-averse provider would seek to set a high contracting volume as insurance against price risk, hoping that some other provider will choose a low contracting volume and thereby raise the downstream second-stage price level.
How would the lowest contracting be chosen in practice? Although no provider would want to be the one choosing the lowest contracting volume, such a provider may arise natu- 7 It is easy to show that this extension is well defined and constitutes an equilibrium. However, when f = k, the equilibrium may no longer be uniquely characterized as above. In this case, ISP is indifferent between two prices if even the higher one guarantees full network utilization. This leads to the emergence of equilibria where ISP can raise his price without any loss of second-stage income, violating the law of one price. To exclude such unrealistic equilibria, our construction explicitly restricts attention to equilibria that are the limit of equilibria arising when every f < k. rally in practice, for example, due to asymmetries in information, risk aversion, or timing. Nevertheless, the lack of symmetric equilibrium may be a source of uncertainty for network providers considering investment into bandwidth.
Proof of Theorem 4: Clearly, market potential is not -low since can achieve a positive profit by choosing a sufficiently low contracting volume , subject to market potential not being 0-low.
Suppose first that market potential is -high. The secondstage subgame has a pure-strategy equilibrium, which is independent of , for
. The right-hand side must be nonnegative since has no incentive to decrease his contracting volume. Hence, the left-hand side is positive, and can increase his expected utility by raising his contracting volume slightly. This is a contradiction, so as required. We now quantify the impact of one downstream provider's choice of contracting volume on its competitors' utility. If market potential is -high, an increase of by results in a negative marginal externality on the other downstream ISPs' payoffs; an increase of by , for any , results in zero marginal externality on the other downstream ISPs' payoffs.
Choosing a low contracting volume is like providing a "public good" 8 to the oligopoly, by raising the general price level, but doing so is privately costly to , as it implies a low level of insurance against demand uncertainty. In the case of -intermediate market potential, the choices of the contracting volumes result in externalities with the opposite sign, so greater contracting volumes benefit other ISPs. The presence of externalities means that downstream providers have an incentive to coordinate their actions by collusion. In this case, there is a particular incentive for a provider to make side-payments to a competitor in return for this provider agreeing to refrain from entering into forward contracts.
Proof of 
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper started with the observation that a dynamic pricing system for the Internet would ensure a more efficient allocation of resources. However, without forward contracting, providers would be exposed to substantial price risk due to the uncertainty in market demand. Could forward contracting remove this price risk? In the absence of any strategic interaction, e.g., in a communication network operated by a single provider, the answer is yes. When strategic interaction is considered in a multiprovider network, the situation is more complex. Forward contracting weakens a provider's strategic incentive to charge high prices. Thus, in the presence of an upstream monopoly, the optimal forward contracting strategy is a tradeoff between reducing price risk and seeking to ensure high prices in the future. When the contracting provider is part of an oligopoly, the optimal contracting strategy will also be dependent on its competitors' strategies.
In this paper, we have analyzed the incentives for forward contracting by ISPs competing to supply bandwidth on a downstream network segment, when a single ISP with significant market power supplies bandwidth on a complementary upstream network segment. In order to determine the incentives for contracting, we have first studied the subsequent pricing equilibrium that arises in different contracting scenarios. Depending on the level of market potential compared to the available bandwidth capacity, the pricing outcome can be characterized as an equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies.
We can draw some conclusions on the choice of forward contracts over two stages assuming the market's price-sensitivity is random and the downstream firms are risk-averse. Note that in addition to the benefits, there are also risks associated with forward contracting. Provided that market potential is not so low that downstream prices are competed down to zero, we prove that any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of positive contracting volumes must be asymmetric and have a unique lowest contracting volume. This gives rise to a version of the game of "Chicken": As the provider who chooses this lowest contracting volume is exposed to the risk of more price uncertainty than the other competitors, no selfish risk-averse provider would want to be the one choosing the lowest equilibrium contracting volume. In practice, this instability may discourage investment into bandwidth. The reason is that forward contracts have a negative impact on a provider's strategic incentives during the pricing stage. A natural low-contracting provider may arise in the presence of asymmetries, for example, in risk aversion or timing.
We further prove that the choice of contracting volumes causes externalities, both negative and positive. An increase in the lowest contracting volume has a negative marginal externality on other downstream ISPs. An increase in any other contracting volume has no externality for high market potential, but a positive marginal externality for intermediate market potential. In this sense, we can think of the downstream ISP with the least forward contracting as providing a public good to the oligopoly. A consequence is an incentive for providers to collude on contracting choice, as discussed below.
In summary, for risk-averse ISPs operating under this market structure employing forward contracts, this paper provides some initial practical guidelines. First, if an ISP believes that every competitor will choose a high volume of forward contracting, then he would be well advised to choose a low contracting volume. Second, a provider with a high contracting volume might want to act in such a way that a low-contracting provider would choose a lower contracting volume than would be privately optimal. It could achieve this through side-payments or other strategic behavior. Third, given that forward contracts have a negative impact on a provider's strategic incentives during the pricing stage, network providers might want to vertically integrate with the upstream provider in order to eliminate this effect. Of course, this paper is an initial investigation into this topic, and our model is somewhat restrictive. One interesting direction for future research would be to consider interactions between ISPs linked by other network shapes.
Finally, our framework could have other networking applications. For example, similar risk-return tradeoffs might exist in last-hop wireless spectrum markets; see [23] .
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: 1) Assume market potential is -high. At the given prices, assumptions (5)- (7) imply that capacity is exhausted, so no has an incentive to lower his price. From (21) and (24), it follows that , and it was shown in (20) that, together with the fact that capacity is exhausted, this implies that has no incentive to raise his price. Therefore, this point is indeed a pure-strategy equilibrium. To establish uniqueness, consider any pure-strategy equilibrium. Note that every must have a positive profit and, in particular, a positive market share in equilibrium since can achieve a positive profit by choosing the price given in (24) regardless of its competitors' strategies. It follows that any two and must choose the same price since otherwise the ISP with the lower price would have an incentive to raise its price. Next, assumptions (7)- (9) imply that, unless the price equals the value given in (24), either each downstream ISP's market share is less than its capacity or the total demand cannot be served by the downstream ISPs. In both cases, a downstream ISP would have an incentive to change its price, which shows that (24) must hold in equilibrium. This establishes uniqueness. 2) Assume market potential is -low. If every downstream network chooses a price of zero, then from (5) and (22), the total demand satisfies . Assumptions (7) and (8) (7)- (9), the market share obtained by each is where the inequality follows from (22) and the fact that . If , then every provider choosing price has an incentive to just undercut the other providers choosing price , contradicting the equilibrium assumption. On the other hand, if
, then assumptions (7)- (9) and (22) has no incentive to deviate from his equilibrium strategy, and therefore the given mixed strategies form a Nash equilibrium. Conversely, to prove uniqueness, consider any mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium given by cumulative density functions . Consider the well-defined low-and high-price thresholds for each Note the following.
• Every obtains a positive expected profit in equilibrium. Indeed, we have already shown that 's profit is positive when choosing regardless of his competitors' strategies. However, must then have a positive low-price threshold and any competitor can obtain a positive profit by slightly undercutting this price.
• In equilibrium, there is sufficient capacity for the total demand at each low-price threshold and each 's market share is positive even at his high-price threshold It is easy to check that the first inequality is required for to have no incentive to play a mixed strategy with a higher , and that the second inequality is required for the with the highest price to have no incentive to play a mixed strategy with a lower . where the second inequality follows from the assumption that . We now substitute (66) into (65), obtaining . Combining (58), (63), (64), and , we get which establishes the lemma for .
